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As noted in the case syllabus for the Selective Draft Law Cases 245 U.S. 366,
Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government not in conflict with
the constitutional guarantees of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the
very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the
citizen to render military service in case of need and the right of the government to compel
it.1

Mandatory military service, called conscription for the rest of this paper, was first used during the
American Civil War. It became clear that reliance upon volunteerism and the existing militia
system would not serve the military needs of the Union beyond 1862. Decades later, as the United
States again needed to quickly amass and maintain a sizable military, conscription was used to
quickly increase the size of the standing military through a federal form of conscription. Similar
to the American Civil War, the US Congress responded with a conscription bill in 1917 to create
another federally controlled system of manpower procurement.
Republican Representative Julius Kahn introduced the Selective Service Act. The members of
Congress, supportive of conscription, believed that men were required to serve the nation during
its times of need. They argued further of the need for an effective plan to muster and train the
requisite number of men into the military. In their view, reliance upon volunteerism would not
ensure the military would expand to the size required to participate in this current conflict.
Opponents of conscription expressed their concerns regarding the growing expanse of the military
within American society. In their view, conscription represented yet another extension of power
beyond what is granted in the US Constitution. David Hollingsworth (R-OH) was vocal regarding
his concerns of conscription since he viewed conscription as a step toward militarism within the
United States. Hollingsworth said, “I would rather resign and let the people back home send to
Washington a more subservient tool of militarism.”2 According to Hollingsworth, conscription
and its large standing military represented
The end of free institutions in America, destructive of that form of government which
Lincoln in his inspired words at Gettysburg said our forefathers had brought forth on this
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continent and which he and other sturdy, unflinching American patriots have ever since
maintained without foreign cooperation or entanglements.3

Hollingsworth’s caution was shared by other members of Congress since they feared conscription
created military fervor.
Despite its critics, President Woodrow Wilson supported the measure, then signed the bill into law
on May 18, 1917. Wilson additionally issued a proclamation on that same day. This proclamation,
Proclamation 1370, restated the requirements of self-registration of men, penalties for those that
did not register and comply with conscription, and penalties for men that committed fraud. Wilson,
in a similar tact to that of President Abraham Lincoln, made pleas to a man’s patriotism to
encourage compliance. Both of these presidents used patriotism to measure and determine loyalty
and obedience among the American male population. Wilson, however, took this idea a step
further, knowing that conscription was an unpopular policy. He discussed how compliance for
conscription represented unity within the United States. He likened obedience and compliance
with conscription to that of service in the military since the United States now united service of
soldiers and actions by civilians around compliance. While conscription had been used before,
Wilson explained the uniqueness of this time since it fostered a new requirement of service to the
nation and a duty for all Americans. Previously, Americans (including civilians) were not united
around a common purpose of service to the state and toward compliance for conscription law.
Assignment into their proper roles of service, according to Wilson, would take place through this
new legislation by the US Congress. “Congress,” as Wilson explained, “has provided that the
Nation shall be organized for war by selection, that each man shall be classified for service in the
place to which it shall best serve the general good to call him.”4 Wilson emphasized the
significance of this moment since “it is a new manner of accepting and vitalizing our duty to give
ourselves with thoughtful devotion to the common purpose of us all”; further, “it is in no sense a
conscription of the unwilling” because it represented “selection from a Nation which has
volunteered.”5 For Wilson, this time represented “the day which the manhood of the country shall
step forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals to which this Nation is consecrated” since it
was vital “that there be no gaps in the ranks.”6 Wilson, in an effort to again stress the new
requirement of self-registration of men, referred to registration day “as a great day of patriotic
devotion and obligation” for America’s men.7 Registration, once completed by provost marshals
in districts at the state level, was called a man’s individual responsibility and deemed his “duty.”8
While this sense of duty was reserved for the draft eligible male population, all Americans were
expected to participate since the success of conscription relied on total cooperation and
participation of Americans. As Wilson explained, every man was being called on “whether he is
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himself to be registered or not, to see to it that the name of every male person of the designated
ages is written on the lists of honor.”9
The Legislative and Executive Branches, as detailed in the US Constitution, are allocated different
powers regarding the militia. The militia system had been the primary system since militia units
were permitted to be federalized for specific objectives. According to Article I, Section 8, the
Congress has the right “to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”10 Congress, additionally, was permitted “to provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may
be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipling
proscribed by Congress.”11 As per the duties outlined in Article II, Section 2, “The President shall
be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
states, when called into actual service of the United States.”12 As shown through the US
Constitution, the raising, arming, and training of the militia was the power of the Congress.
Control of troops in active service of the United States was then the power of the President. This
demonstrates and affirms this separation of powers between the branches regarding the militia or
military.
The existing militia system and volunteerism were effective to provide for the military needs of
the nation until 1862. Several militia acts changed the requirements of presidents to require court
orders to summon militiamen for federal service, changed the requisite size of the standing
military, and expanded the president’s ability to federalize militiamen. In 1862, to compensate for
the small size of the Union military during the American Civil War, the Militia Act of 1862
lengthened the terms of service for militia. President Lincoln was then able to summon an
additional 100,000 militiamen for federal service by requiring states to muster in different quota
of men for federal service based upon their state’s population. This proved difficult since many
state governors often intentionally disrupted this process or did not supply their state’s mandated
quota. The US Congress responded with the Enrollment Act in 1863, which created a federal
system of conscription that was overseen by a network of federal agents. Opponents of the
Enrollment Act echoed concerns around its perceived abuse of personal liberty, that it violated
freedom of choice, and disagreed that the Congress had the ability to raise armies outside of using
the existing militia system. The creation of this federal system of conscription then drastically
changed notions of service to the federal state as it also changed notions regarding the requirements
of citizenship.
During the American Civil War, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard a case of challenge
regarding a draft summons. Conscription calls took place within districts of limited volunteerism.
The complainants of this case questioned Congress’s ability to bypass enrollment into state militias
by permitting men to be enrolled into the regular army. This raised questions about whether men
in militia units were to wait to be federalized rather than be directly conscripted into a federal
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system of manpower procurement. While the US Congress had the authority to use the
militia, Justice C. J. Lowrie wrote, “it is apparent that it is not founded on the power of ‘calling
forth the militia,’ for those who are drafted under it have not been armed, organized, and
disciplined under the militia law, and are not called forth as militia under state officers, as the
constitution requires.”13 These justices in Pennsylvania ultimately placed an injunction against
further conscription from taking place in the state. Despite these efforts to curb and restrict
conscription in the state of Pennsylvania, the injunction was soon lifted following a motion by the
US government. This turn of events resulted in part because the composition of the justices had
changed by the time the motion was received. These new justices determined that “the state court
could not interfere by injunction, even if the draft law were unconstitutional.”14 This remains the
only time when conscription was reviewed by the courts at this time. The US Supreme Court did
not hear a case on the legality of conscription during the American Civil War.
Despite the efforts of President Wilson to eliminate resistance, resistance against conscription
persisted during World War I much as it had during the American Civil War. While the tactics
and means of resistance differed, conscription remained a detested policy. Legal questions were
raised during World War I regarding the use of conscription to increase the size of the military at
this time of war and national emergency when troops would be sent overseas. Could the Congress
create another or new system of federal conscription? Would this violate provisions regarding the
Congress’s responsibility to the notion of militias? Would this mandatory military service violate
a man’s personal liberty? Does a man have a requirement of service to the federal state in this
time of war and national emergency?
By the end of 1917, just months after Wilson signed the Selective Service Act into law, the US
Supreme Court decided a case that dealt with many of these legal questions. This case, known as
the Selective Draft Law Cases, addressed legal issues from conscription cases in the states of New
York and Minnesota. According to the case, “The service which may be exacted of the citizen
under the army power is not limited to the specific purpose for which Congress is expressly
authorized, by the militia clause, to call the militia.”15 As Chief Justice White explained in the
opinion,
It is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does
not and can not [sic] include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This
however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no
sanction to it and which there can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its
exertion is in no substantial sense a power.16

Chief Justice White provided a historical explanation of how military expectations and regulations
had changed through history, which included a survey of military rules and regulations before
American independence. In this survey, White exposed the expectations of military service for all
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citizens “wherever the public exigency exacted, whether at home or abroad.”17 Following
independence, the Articles of Confederation rendered minimal powers to the unicameral
legislature. At this stage of American political development, “Congress had no such power,
as its authority was absolutely limited to making calls upon the States for the military forces needed
to create and maintain the army, each State being bound for its quota as called.”18 Despite this
limitation upon the legislature as designed by the Articles of Confederation, “The duty of the
citizen to render military service and the power to compel him against his consent to do so was
expressly sanctioned by the constitutions of at least nine of the States.”19
Justice White wrote,
We are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen
of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the
rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative
body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation
of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that
the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement.20

In addition to legal issues being raised in relation to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment was also mentioned in the opinion. As White wrote, the Fourteenth Amendment
“broadened the national scope of the Government under the Constitution by causing citizenship of
the United States to be paramount and dominant, instead of being subordinate and derivative, and
therefore, operating as it does upon all the powers conferred by the Constitution.”21
There were several cases during the American Civil War, in the Confederate States of American,
that sought to determine the legality of conscription. The state supreme courts of Texas, Alabama,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia, in contrast to the state of Pennsylvania, upheld
the legality of conscription. In the state of Georgia, the court argued that the Confederate Congress
had been afforded the authority to require the service of men, and men were then expected to
serve.22 Unlike the case in the state of Pennsylvania, the courts in these Confederate States
affirmed their Congress’s ability to introduce a new federal system of conscription. It is worth
noting that service within the Confederate States of America’s conscription system was restricted
to white male citizens between a certain age range. In contrast to this, conscription in the Union
did not bear this same citizenship restriction. In the Union, by contrast, those that had begun the
process of naturalization were liable for service. This raises significant legal questions regarding
the requirements of service to a federal state devoid of citizenship.
We see the affirmation of requirements of mandatory service in the Selective Draft Law Cases
opinion. According to the Court,
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The seceding States wrote into the constitution which was adopted to regulate the
government which they sought to establish, in identical words, the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States which we here have under consideration. And when the
right to enforce under that instrument a selective draft law which was enacted, not differing
in principle from the one here in question, was challenged, its validity was upheld,
evidently after great consideration.23

This ruling reaffirmed the Confederate States of America state courts’ decisions from the
American Civil War. By upholding these earlier rulings, the US Supreme Court reaffirmed the
authority for the Congress to implement conscription. This text from the opinion showcases that
the rights and powers of the Confederate Congress are identical to those of the Congress in the
United States. Given that these branches of government were identical in structure and
responsibility, the US Supreme Court used these state cases to justify conscription during World
War I. While the US Supreme Court would hear other cases upon issues related to conscription
beyond World War I, the Selective Draft Law Cases opinion affirmed the legal grounding of
conscription in the United States.
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